Abstract-An I(2) analysis of inflation and the markup is undertaken for the G7 economies and Australia. We find that the levels of prices and costs are best described as I(2) processes and that, except for Japan, a linear combination of the log levels of prices and costs cointegrate to the markup that is integrated of order 1. It is also shown that the markup in each case co-integrates with inflation and that higher inflation is associated with a lower markup in the long run.
I. Introduction
T HE proposition examined in this paper is that there exists a long-run relationship in the sense proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) wherein the markup decreases as inflation increases and vice versa. 1 This paper estimates this relationship using data from the G7 economies and Australia. A central feature of our analysis is that the level of prices and costs may be taken to be integrated of order 2, denoted I(2), for the purposes of modeling. In other words, both the differences of prices and costs and their levels that comprise the markup display persistent behavior over the samples investigated. This requires us to make use of recently developed techniques for the estimation of I(2) processes developed by Johansen (1995a Johansen ( , 1995b inter alia. 2 Bénabou (1992) argues within a price-taking model that higher inflation leads to greater competition and therefore a lower markup. In contrast, Russell, Evans, and Preston (1997) , Chen and Russell (1998) , Russell (1998) , Athey, Bagwell, and Sanichiro (1998) and Simon (1999) focus on the difficulties that price-setting firms face when adjusting prices in an inflationary environment where there is missing information. In this case, the lower markup with higher inflation is interpreted as the higher cost of overcoming the missing information with higher inflation. Importantly, Russell et al., Chen and Russell, and Russell argue that information remains missing in the steady state and that the relationship between rates of steady-state inflation and the markup will also remain in the steady state. 3 Banerjee , Cockerell, and Russell (1998) using Australian inflation data find strong empirical support of the proposition. An important question is whether the findings of Banerjee et al. are in some way peculiar to the Australian data. The peculiarity of the data may be due to the nature of the shocks encountered over the sample examined, the behavior of the Australian monetary authorities, or the structure of the economy. Alternatively, the findings may be applicable to developed western economies in general when inflation is nonstationary. To this end, we proceed to examine the proposition for the G7 economies and Australia.
The empirical investigation proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate an I(2) system for each economy of the core variables of interest, namely prices and costs. Except for Japan, we find that a polynomially co-integrating relationship is present between the level of the markup and the changes in the core variables. 4 Having obtained an estimate from the I(2) analysis of the long-run relationship between the markup and general inflation of the core variables, we proceed to estimate an I(1) system to obtain the direct relationship between price inflation alone and the markup. The estimated I(1) system is a particular and full reduction of the I(2) system and corroborates the findings in the I(2) system.
Although differences emerge between the economies, the finding of polynomial co-integration for the G7 economies and Australia is remarkably robust. The only exception is Japan where the levels of prices and costs co-integrate to an I(1) variable but it cannot be interpreted as the markup. Therefore, it appears that, except for Japan, the proposition that there exists a negative long-run relationship between inflation and the markup is consistent with the data in the G7 economies as well as in Australia.
II. An Imperfect Competition Markup Model of Prices
We propose estimating an imperfect competition markup equation in the Layard/Nickell tradition for the eight economies. 5 It is assumed that, in the long run, firms desire a constant markup, q, of prices, p, on unit costs net of the cost of inflation. Short-run deviations in the markup are due to the business cycle and nonmodeled shocks. For an Received for publication January 4, 1999. Revision accepted for publication July 20, 2000.
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1 The logarithm of the markup, mu, is defined as mu ϵ p Ϫ ¥ iϭ1 k i c i , where p and the c i 's are the logarithms of prices and the costs of production, respectively, and ¥ iϭ1 k i ϭ 1. If the latter condition is not satisfied, the relationship between prices and costs cannot be termed the markup.
2 An alternative way to proceed with the empirical investigation would be to consider the mean of inflation shifting from high early in the sample to low later in the sample with the markup shifting correspondingly in the opposite direction. This so-called cobreaking approach would consider inflation and the markup series to be I(0) with breaks-to give the appearance of I(1) series-but with the breaks in both series happening at roughly the same time in order to generate a relationship. See Campos, Ericsson, and Hendry (1996) and Hendry and Mizon (1998) for a general discussion of breaking and cobreaking. 3 The steady state is defined as all nominal variables growing at the same constant rate.
4 Polynomial co-integration occurs when the co-integrated levels of the data co-integrate with the differences in the levels. In our case, the I(2) levels of prices and costs co-integrate to the markup, which is I(1), and the markup then co-integrates with inflation, which is also I(1). For a detailed discussion concerning polynomial co-integration, see Johansen (1995b). open economy, the main inputs are labor and imports, and we can write the inflation cost long-run markup equation as 6
where ulc and pm are unit labor costs and unit import prices, respectively, and ␦ and are positive parameters. Lowercase variables are in logarithms, and ⌬ represents the change in the variable. When the inflation cost coefficient, , is zero, inflation imposes no costs on the firm in the long run, and the long-run markup equation collapses to the standard Layard/Nickell model. In the more general case when Ͼ 0, inflation imposes costs on the firm in terms of a lower markup net of the cost of inflation. 7 This is given by q Ϫ ⌬p.
The coefficients ␦ and 1 Ϫ ␦ in equation (1) are the long-run price elasticities with respect to unit labor costs and import prices, respectively. Linear homogeneity is imposed as the coefficients sum to 1 so that q represents the markup of prices on costs. Linear homogeneity 6 Banerjee et al. (1998) derives equation (1) and considers in some detail issues concerning the integration properties of the data. The form of the long-run price equation is a generalization of that estimated by de Brouwer and Ericsson (1998) in the sense that we allow for dynamic error correction. Two other papers estimating markup models of inflation are Richards and Stevens (1987) and Franz and Gordon (1993) . 7 The long-run price equation (1) cannot be strictly true, as it implies that the markup approaches zero as inflation tends to an infinite rate. Russell (1998) overcomes this problem by specifying the cost of inflation in the form 1 [⌬p/(⌬p ϩ )], where is trend productivity. Consequently, as inflation tends to an infinite rate, the cost of inflation approaches 1 . It is assumed that the proposed log-linear model of inflation costs is a fair approximation of the "true" relationship over the small range of inflation experienced by the economies examined. 
Statistics are computed with four lags of the core variables. See appendix B of Banerjee and Russell (2000) for details of the predetermined variables on which the analysis is conditioned. Q(s/r) is the likelihood-ratio statistic for determining s conditional on r. Q(r) is the likelihood-ratio statistic for determining r in the I(1) analysis. Critical values are given in Paruolo (1996) as shown in footnote 14.
suggests that, all else equal, an increase in costs is fully reflected in higher prices in the long run, leaving the markup unchanged.
A. The I(2) System
The I(2) system analysis is an extension of the now standard I(1) system analysis. For a detailed theoretical outline of the I(2) analysis, see Haldrup (1998 ), Johansen (1995a , 1995b , and Paruolo (1996) . Alternatively, for a brief "penetrable" survey of the I(2) theory in relation to the model estimated here, see Banerjee et al. (1998) . Other empirical applications of the I(2) theory can be found in Engsted and Haldrup (1999) and Juselius (1998) .
For illustration, suppose the long-run price equation can be written as a second-order vector autoregression of the core variables, x t , of dimension n ϫ 1:
where is a vector of unrestricted constant terms, and D t is a vector of predetermined variables that are assumed not to enter the cointegration space and on which the empirical analysis is conditioned. The lowercase variables are in logs, and, in our case, n ϭ 3 and the core variables, x t , are the price level, unit labor costs, and import prices. It is assumed that the variable ⑀ t is an n-dimensional Gaussian vector of errors.
The I(2) analysis provides us with the orthogonal decomposition into the I(0), I(1), and I(2) relationships of the data with dimensions, r, s, and n Ϫ r Ϫ s, respectively. Furthermore, the number of polynomially co-integrating vectors is equal to the number of I(2) trends, n Ϫ r Ϫ s. 
B. The Data
The data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and taken from the June 1997 OECD Data Compendium. 8 The length of the data sample for each economy is the maximum possible from that source given the series involved. West German data is used for Germany to avoid data problems associated with the reunification with East Germany.
Except for the United States, the price index is the private consumption implicit price deflator at "factor cost." 9 Unit labor costs are calculated as total labor compensation divided by constant price GDP. Import price is the implicit price deflator for the imports of goods and services.
The consumption deflator at factor cost was initially used for the United States but gave conflicting results. Although the I(2) analysis indicated that the level of prices and costs were best described as I(2) statistical processes, there were a number of indicators to suggest that these series did not co-integrate to the markup. As the "no markup" result is not useful in investigating the proposition, the GDP implicit price deflator at factor cost was used. 10 The predetermined variables are the log change in the unemployment rate and a number of spike intervention dummies to capture the sometimes erratic short-run wage and price behavior of firms and labor. 11 This is especially the case during the OPEC oil-price shocks and large shifts in exchange rates and tax regimes. A step dummy is introduced for the period leading up to March 1968 for the United States, March 1975 for France, and March 1970 for Canada. These capture a level shift in the markup that is observable in the data and can be interpreted as reflecting a shift in the competitive environment in these economies. 12 The log change in the unemployment rate represents the business cycle in the model. An alternative specification of the empirical model would be to include the level of unemployment in the co-integrating space as an endogenous or exogenous variable. However, it is not clear what the economic relationship between the markup, inflation, and the level of unemployment would be in the long run. There is some indication that the relationship may be highly nonlinear and may differ substantially among economies. Furthermore, such an inclusion would alter the interpretation of this variable from that of an indicator of the business cycle. It was therefore decided to allow for the effects of the business cycle by conditioning on a stationary predetermined variable given by the log change in the unemployment rate and its lags.
The integration properties of the data were investigated using PT and DF-GLS univariate unit root tests from Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) . 13 Prices are clearly I(2) except for Japan and West Germany which are marginally I(2). Similarly, unit labor costs are mostly I(2) or marginally I(2). One exception is Australia for which it appears that unit labor costs may be I(1). The tests also indicate that import prices may be I(1) for many of the economies. However, univariate tests of the logarithm of the ratios of prices to unit labor costs and prices to import prices show clear acceptance of the hypothesis that they are I(1), which can occur only if all the core variables are I(2), given that prices are I(2). Consequently, we proceed under the assumption that the core variables are I(2). This assumption is supported by the I(2) and I(1) systems analysis (following) where the results are consistent only with the assumption that the core variables are I(2). Finally, the log of the unemployment rate is found to be best described as an I(1) variable. Table 1 shows the results of the joint trace tests for determining r and s for the eight economies. In the case of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, the hypothesis of r ϭ 1, n Ϫ r Ϫ s ϭ 1 is accepted, and our findings are corroborated by looking at the roots of the companion matrix. (See appendix B of Banerjee and Russell (2000) .) 14 The results therefore show that the levels of prices and costs in each of these economies contain an I(2) trend. Moreover, because r ϭ 1, there is only one co-integrating vector, and, hence, it is of the polynomially co-integrating type.
C. The I(2) System Results
For the remaining economies of Italy, Canada, and Australia, there is a marginal rejection of r ϭ 1, n Ϫ r Ϫ s ϭ 1. However, we choose to accept this null hypothesis because the critical values on which inference is based are asymptotic and have been computed under the assumption that there are no predetermined variables, including dummies, in the system. Not only would taking account of predetermined variables raise the critical values (thereby leading to acceptance of the maintained hypothesis), the evidence from the roots of the companion matrix for these economies are unambiguously in favor of our hypothesis. 15 The subsequent I(1) system analysis in the next section confirms these results.
Imposing r ϭ 1 and n Ϫ r Ϫ s ϭ 1 on each system imposes a polynomial co-integrating vector on the analysis in each case. Table 2 reports the normalized co-integrating vectors with linear homogeneity imposed for each economy. Except for Japan, the hypothesis of linear homogeneity is accepted and, therefore, the levels of prices and costs co-integrate to the markup in the polynomially cointegrating vector.
For Japan, Germany, France, and Canada, import prices enter the markup with an insignificant coefficient. The analysis is therefore 8 See appendix A for further details. 9 The private consumption implicit price deflator at "factor cost" is calculated as P ϭ P MP /(1 ϩ tax), where P MP is the consumption implicit price deflator at market prices and tax is the proportion of indirect tax less subsidies in nominal GDP. Although the factor cost adjustment is theoretically necessary in practice, it has little impact on the results. 10 The failure to estimate the markup using the consumption deflator may be because the unit labor cost variable is for the whole economy, and a poor proxy for unit labor costs associated with consumption expenditures for the United States.
11 Three lags of the unemployment variable are initially incorporated with insignificant terms subsequently excluded.
12 Further details of the predetermined variables are available in appendix B of Banerjee and Russell (2000) . 13 These results are available on request from the authors.
14 The 90% and 95% critical values for the case of no predetermined variables are taken from Paruolo (1996) and are reported in the table below. The 95% critical values are in italics. Other critical values are available in tables compiled by Rahbek, Jørgensen, and Kongsted (1999) and Johansen (1995b The moduli of the first four roots are 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, and 0.7144 for Italy; 1.0, 1.0, 0.9881, and 0.8161 for Canada; and 1.0, 1.0, 0.9417, and 0.6533 for Australia-under the assumption of r ϭ 1. A finding of n Ϫ r Ϫ s ϭ 0 would therefore not be consistent with the third root of close to unit for these economies if r ϭ 1 is maintained. reestimated excluding import prices, and the results of the joint trace tests for the two variable systems are reported in table 1 and again support the hypothesis that r ϭ 1 and n Ϫ r Ϫ s ϭ 1. Reported in table 2 are the normalized co-integrating vectors. The results now hold as before for Germany, France, and Canada, but the estimated coefficients for Japan are not interpretable as the markup because the test for linear homogeneity continues to be rejected strongly.
Because the steady state is defined by the condition ⌬p ϭ ⌬ulc ϭ ⌬pm, we see in table 2 that, for the economies where the markup is defined, the sum of the coefficients on the difference terms is negative. This implies that there is a negative relationship between general inflation and the markup in the long run.
III. Estimating the I(1) System
The I(2) analysis provides estimates of polynomial co-integration between a linear combination of the markup and the differences in the core variables. In an economic sense, it is necessary for ⌬p ϭ ⌬ulc ϭ ⌬pm in the very long run. However, the method of summing the coefficients on the difference terms provides only an approximate estimate of the relationship between inflation and the markup, given that the variables may grow at different rates over the finite samples.
Furthermore, the theoretical models of Russell et al. (1997) , Chen and Russell (1998) , and Russell (1998) posit a long-run relationship between the markup and steady-state price inflation alone.
Having established polynomial co-integration in the I(2) analysis, a particular reduction to I(1) space helps us establish the relationship of primary concern to us-namely, between price inflation and the markup. To implement this reduction, we make use of the result that the decomposition into the I(0), I(1), and I(2) directions, with basis vectors given by ␤Ј 1 , ␤Ј 2 , and ␤Ј 3 respectively, is an orthogonal one.
In particular, the vectors ␤Ј 1 and ␤Ј 2 lie in the space orthogonal to ␤Ј 3 . Thus, if ␤Ј 3 ϵ (1, a, b) , then a basis for the space orthogonal to ␤Ј 3 is given by the matrix
where f is any 3 ϫ 1 vector that satisfies the restriction that fЈ␤ 3 0, provides the transformation to I(1) which keeps all the co-integrating and polynomially co-integrating informa- is a valid full reduction and, under linear homogeneity, a ϭ b ϭ 1. 16 Furthermore, we can retrieve the implicit markup of prices on unit costs from this I(1) system by rearranging the estimated long-run or co-integrating relationship. 17 Tests of the number of co-integrating vectors in the I(1) system (⌬p t , mulc t , rer t )Ј show that, except for the United States, the hypothesis of one co-integrating vector is accepted. 18 For the United States, there is a marginal rejection of the hypothesis, although the eigenvalues of the companion matrix strongly support the finding of one co-integrating vector. Given also the argument in subsection IIC that the critical values are likely to be affected by the presence of dummy variables, we proceed on the basis of one co-integrating vector for all the economies. Table 3 reports the adjustment coefficients and the error-correction terms for each economy. We see that the ECM appears strongly in each of the "markup" equations and, except for Italy, is insignificant in the "real exchange rate" equations. We see also that the adjustment coefficient in the markup equation is on average three times that in the inflation equation. This suggests that, when these economies are shocked away from the long-run relationship, adjustment back to equilibrium is more through changes in the markup, via the goods and labor markets, than by changes in the rate of inflation through actions of the monetary authorities. Table 4 reports the implicit long-run price elasticities with respect to costs from the I(1) analysis and the equivalent estimates from the I(2) analysis. Also shown are the estimated inflation cost coefficients, , from the I(1) and I(2) analyses. 19 The long-run impact of an increase of one percentage point in annual steady-state inflation on the markup is shown in the final column and ranges between 0.3% for the United States and 2% for Italy. It appears likely, therefore, that the long-run relationship between inflation and the markup is important in an economic sense.
IV. Conclusion
One explanation of the negative long-run relationship in the data is that the 1970s were a period when supply shocks from the energy and labor markets were very prevalent. The low markup, therefore, simply reflects the lags in price adjustment following the shocks. The adjustment appears to be very slow for economies with little or no price controls. In most cases, the relatively low markups persist for around ten years following the shocks, and the markup does not fully recover until the economy again experiences low inflation. Figure 1 presents the long-run relationship, LR, for the United States and the United Kingdom from the I(1) analysis along with the realizations of the markup and inflation for five distinct inflationary periods indicated by different symbols. 20 If the "supply shocks" argument is correct, then different mean levels of inflation would not 16 Hans Christian Kongsted suggested this transformation in Banerjee et al. (1998) . 17 The markup of prices on import prices might be loosely referred to as the "real exchange rate" due to its similarity with the relative price of traded and nontraded goods as used by Swan (1963) as a measure of the real exchange rate in his classic article.
18 Appendix C of Banerjee and Russell (2000) reports the results of the I(1) analysis in more detail. 19 The latter are an approximation calculated by assuming ⌬p ϭ ⌬ulc ϭ ⌬pm for each economy in table 1. 20 Similar graphs can be constructed for the other economies, but for brevity only the United States and the United Kingdom is shown here. Appendix D of Banerjee and Russell (2000) reports scatter graphs of inflation and the estimated markup for each economy along with the long-run relationship, LR, for each economy. affect the behavior of the markup. Consequently, realizations of the markup and inflation from different periods of inflation would be distributed evenly along the entire curve in figure 1 . This, however, is not the case.
It may be seen clearly from figure 1 that, if the data were subdivided into periods of inflation with different means, the associated mean levels of the markup are different. For example, for both the United States and the United Kingdom, the early 1960s are shown as crosses on figure 1, and we see that the markup is high during a period of low inflation. The late 1960s and early 1970s are shown as squares and was a period of slightly higher inflation and a slightly lower markup. We can follow the relationship through each inflationary period until the observations return to hover around low inflation and a high markup for the period following the early 1990s recession.
If the actual observations are followed individually (and not by periods as in the figure), a loose negative short-run relationship between inflation and the markup may sometimes be observed in the data. However, any short-run relationship is confined to different sections of the long-run curve depending on the general rate of inflation. Thus, although short-run mechanisms are almost certainly reflected in some of the data, the relationship is strongly driven by the general rate of inflation.
The ability to separate actual observations of inflation and the markup into distinct periods with higher inflation associated with a lower markup and vice versa is further confirmation that inflation is a nonstationary process.
A NOTE ON ENFORCEMENT SPENDING AND VAT REVENUES
Eduardo M. R. A. Engel, Alexander Galetovic, and Claudio E. Raddatz* Abstract-Tax compliance studies usually focus on the effect of enforcement spending on tax evasion. Reliable estimates are difficult to obtain because evasion data are often suspect. This note shows how tax revenues can be used instead of evasion data to estimate the impact of changes in enforcement spending. Applying our method to Chilean data, we find that $1 (USD) of additional enforcement spending increases VAT revenues by $31. Moreover, current levels of spending could increase by 40% and still be within sample values. Hence, a 10% increase in spending could reduce evasion from its current rate of 23% to 20%.
I. Introduction
O NE OF THE main fiscal problems in developing countries is the high level of tax evasion. For example, in the case of Chile, where evasion levels are low by developing-country standards, studies suggest that currently about 50% of the income tax and 23% of the value-added tax (VAT) are evaded. 1 All in all, it is estimated that evasion amounts to about 6% of GDP, which is quite high when compared with tax revenues of approximately 18% of GDP.
A recurrent explanation for these high levels of evasion is that enforcement is lax because the agencies in charge of collecting taxes are understaffed, underpaid, and poorly equipped. Quite often, it is argued that their budgets should be increased. Yet whether that is a good idea depends, among other things, on the yield of the additional expenditures, and thus is an empirical question. Furthermore, in developing countries, data on evasion is often not available or suspect, so that it is difficult to evaluate the effect of changes in enforcement spending or any other policy intervention aimed at reducing evasion.
The purpose of this note is to show how revenue data can be used instead of evasion data to estimate the impact of changes in enforcement spending. This is important because revenue data are regularly collected in most countries and are far more reliable than evasion estimates. The idea is to exploit the elementary accounting identity that relates revenues and evasion to obtain a simple equation that can be estimated with observable data. An estimate of the elasticity of evasion with respect to enforcement spending follows from estimating the coefficients of this equation.
We use the method proposed in this note to quantify the effect of enforcement spending on VAT revenues in Chile, showing that the yield of increasing enforcement spending is substantial. Other things Received for publication March 16, 1999 . Revision accepted for publication July 12, 2000.
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